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It is right and proper that Australia and New Zealand should
undertake their combined share in moulding the world’s
thought. (Miller 1929, p. 242)
Introduction
Two approaches have dominated Western philosophy in Australia: idealism and
materialism. Idealism was prevalent between the 1880s and the 1930s, but dissi-
pated thereafter. Idealism in Australia often reflected Kantian themes, but it also
reflected the revival of interest in Hegel through the work of ‘absolute idealists’
such as T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and Henry Jones. A number of the early New
Zealand philosophers were also educated in the idealist tradition and were influen-
tial in their communities, but produced relatively little. In Australia, materialism
gained prominence through the work of John Anderson, who arrived in Australia in
1927, and continues to be influential. John Anderson had been a student of Henry
Jones, who might therefore be said to have influenced both main strands of
Australian philosophical thought.
Idealism was particularly associated with the work of the first professional
philosophers in Australia, such as Henry Laurie, Francis Anderson, and William
Mitchell (who rejected the label), and a second generation including W. R. Boyce
Gibson. In this chapter, we trace the beginnings of philosophy in Australasia, and
the period of idealist dominance, mainly through these four key figures. Idealism
had broad influence outside of the universities, in public and religious life (Hughes-
Warrington and Tregenza 2008), but that is beyond the scope of this chapter.
The stories of two subsequent philosophical traditions, the Wittgensteinian
influence of the 1940s and 1950s, and the realism and materialism that have been
the most prominent feature of Australian philosophy since the 1950s, are told in the
chapters that follow.
Prelude: Barzillai Quaife (1798–1873), the First Australasian
Philosopher
The honour of being the first to formally teach philosophy in Australia belongs
to the Congregationalist minister Barzillai Quaife, in the 1850s, but teaching
philosophy did not begin on a continuing basis until the 1880s, with the gradual
establishment of universities (Grave 1984; Lockley 1967).
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Quaife was appointed by John Dunmore Lang to the Chair of Mental Philosophy
and Divinity at what was called the Australian College. During his tenure, Quaife
produced probably the first philosophical work to be published in the southern
hemisphere: The Intellectual Sciences (Quaife 1872), a document outlining his
intellectual debt to William Hamilton, James McCosh, H. L. Mansel, and Thomas
Reid. This publication was based on his lectures at the Australian College between
1850 and 1851.
Like those who immediately followed him, Quaife was influenced by nineteenth-
century Scottish thought. However, his thinking was also motivated by a strong
religious impulse, and his moral, ontological, and metaphysical views are coloured
by notions of theistic necessity and the will of God (Grave 1984). His book has been
described as an outline of psychology, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and logic in
theological and anthropomorphic terms, where a conception of reality is argued
which we now associate with ‘the great Chain of Being’ (Passmore 1963, p. 137).
Quaife was an influential and controversial newspaper editor in both Australia
and New Zealand. His political approach to journalism, in the interests of Maori
rights and public accountability, attracted his principal biographer (Kennett 1991).
While a newspaper editor in New Zealand, Quaife’s New Zealand Advertiser and
Bay of Islands Gazette were suppressed for attacks on the government policies on
Maori land rights—rights which Quaife believed were being disregarded (Kennett
1991; Lockley 1967; Moon 1997). In Australia, Quaife was also noted among his
local community in Paddington for decrying racism and preaching equality of men
in relation to the local aboriginals (Hughenden History 2006).
After the demise of the Australian College in 1852, Quaife taught in a school,
ministered to a congregation from home, and unsuccessfully attempted to resurrect
his teaching career. His lack of success in obtaining an appointment may possibly
be gleaned from students’ view of his character: ‘if teaching was his forte, omni-
science was his foible’ (Lockley 1967). Although he produced other works, partic-
ularly on religious themes (Quaife 1845, 1846, 1848), The Intellectual Scienceswas
his last major work, but it left no mark on his successors.
The Background: Early Influences
The first Australasian universities were established during the second half of the
nineteenth century and grew relatively slowly. Institutionally, they represented the
confidence of the colonial societies in which they were established. Intellectually,
they represented both the aspiration for material progress through a highly educated
social group, and the desire to engage with broader currents of European thought.
Much of the intellectual excitement of the second half of the nineteenth century
attached to developments in natural science and the related fields of technology.
Darwin published his Origin of Species in 1859, and evolutionary theory became
prominent in a wide variety of fields, notably through the ‘social Darwinism’ of
thinkers such as Herbert Spencer. Germ theory promised to revolutionise medical
science and public health alike. Physiological discoveries of an apparently minor
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significance concerning the reflexes and the digestive system were taken to point to
the redundancy of mental phenomena in explanations of mechanical and biological
systems (Du Bois-Reymond 1848; Huxley 1874/1901; Passmore 1984).
Empirical psychology gained a significant impetus with the establishment of the
first psychology laboratory by Wilhelm Wundt in 1879. The study of neurology
advanced through the discovery of associations between parts of the brain and
various memory or cognitive deficits. The empirical work of Ebbinghaus, Freud,
Galton, and William James, among others, was becoming increasingly important.
Such influences were carried to Australasia through emigrants, visitors, books, and
journals. Major influences can be traced in the Australasian thought of the time.
There were lively periodicals with an intellectual orientation, including The
Victorian Review, The Melbourne Review, and The Centennial Magazine.
A small number of Australasian figures, such as Alexander Sutherland, author of
The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct, a work influenced by Darwin and
Adam Smith, attracted attention overseas (Irons 1899; Sutherland 1898).
By contrast with the flourishing of natural science and technology, British
philosophy is often regarded as being in decline for much of the early nineteenth
century, and to have recovered only from the 1880s onwards. In 1865, David
Masson located the nadir of British philosophy around 1835, but traced a gradual
recovery in the succeeding 30 years (Masson 1877). A variety of empiricist and
positivist philosophies predominated, with the older Scottish philosophy of com-
mon sense being perhaps the best known. Hume, the Mills, Hamilton, and, later,
Spencer were highly regarded and influential. The broad field of philosophy was,
however, understood to include literary figures, and particularly poets, such as
Coleridge, Wordsworth, Tennyson, and Browning. Idealism was a relatively recent
development in British thought. While Hamilton had been influenced by Kant, the
influence of Hegel began to be felt only in the 1860s, with the publication of the first
edition of James Stirling’s The Secret of Hegel (1865), and the commencement of
Edward Caird’s teaching career at Glasgow.
Scottish Imports
Early Australasian philosophy might almost be characterised as a branch of Scottish
philosophy. During the establishment of the universities of Sydney (1850),Melbourne
(1853), and Adelaide (1874), the main centres of philosophy were all outposts of
Scottish thought. This is not surprising given that many of the first philosophers to be
given appointments were Scots. This included Francis Anderson and later John
Anderson in Sydney, Henry Laurie in Melbourne, and William Mitchell in Adelaide
(Grave 1984). At the oldest of the New Zealand institutions, the University of
Otago (1871), the same tendencies prevailed, with the appointments of a succession
of Scots, Duncan MacGregor, William Salmond, and Francis Dunlop (Pigden 2007).
Elsewhere in New Zealand, highlander Hugh Mackenzie was appointed at Victoria
University (founded 1899), and John Anderson’s brother, William, was appointed
to the University of Auckland (founded 1883) (Ardley 1982).
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English backgrounds, and sometimes an Australian education, could also
be found among those who wrote on or taught philosophical themes, including
John Woolley, Charles Badham, and Bernard Muscio in Sydney, and M. H. Irving,
H. A. Strong, W. E. Hearn, Richard Hodgson, and W. R. Boyce Gibson in
Melbourne. Such backgrounds could also be found elsewhere, including
R. L. Dunbabin in Tasmania (established 1890), George Elton Mayo (educated
by Mitchell in Adelaide) in Queensland (established 1909), and P. R. Le Couteur in
Western Australia (established 1911). Nevertheless, among the more influential
professional philosophers, it was the Scots who predominated. While the Scottish
influence is now well understood in relation to Sydney, particularly through the
writings and influence of John Anderson (Anderson et al. 1962, 1980, 1982; Baker
1979, 1986; Coombs 1996; Franklin 2003; Kennedy 1995; Mackie 1962; Stove,
1977), little attention has been paid to other Scottish intellectuals and traditions that
were influential in Australasia.
Regardless of their background, philosophers in Australasia were constrained
by their relative isolation and broad range of responsibilities. The early
Australasian philosophers taught across very wide fields. Francis Anderson
was to teach ‘Ancient Thought, Modern Philosophy, Ethics and Sociology,
Metaphysics, Logic, Psychology, Politics, and Economics’. Mitchell said his
Chair was more like a sofa, since it was to cover Philosophy, Economics,
Literature, Education, and Psychology (Smart 1962). At Auckland University,
the prodigiously talented J. P Grossman was engaged to teach Commerce,
Economics, History, Commercial Geography, and Mental Science and followed
this by publishing papers on topics as diverse as afforestation, bimetallism,
and proportional representation. In addition, he coached the rugby team!
(Ardley 1982, p. 12) At Otago, MacGregor had both medical and philosophical
training and was noted as a surgeon in Dunedin, before later becoming Inspec-
tor of Lunatic Asylums.
Establishing a community among philosophers in Australia was no easy matter.
As Edmund Morris Miller (1881–1964), an idealist philosopher, psychologist,
administrator, and literary scholar, noted in 1929, there were ‘no strong or concen-
trated bonds of communion or corporate life between the thinkers and scholastic
workers’ in Australia (Miller 1929, p. 242). Conditions in New Zealand were
perhaps even more difficult, which may have contributed to the lack of
a recognisable philosophical school to parallel the materialism inaugurated by
John Anderson in Australia.
Philosophy and Psychology
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, philosophy was conceived
in relation to psychology, and particularly in terms of how they should be distin-
guished from each other. The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy
published articles in each field, dropping the term psychology from its masthead
only in 1946.
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Many of the philosophers of the time wrote on psychology, and not solely among
the idealists. Laurie, Mitchell, and Boyce Gibson saw philosophical psychology as
a key introduction to metaphysics. M. Scott Fletcher, Professor at the University of
Queensland from 1923 to 1938, wrote on The Psychology of the New Testament
(Fletcher 1912). Elton Mayo in Queensland (1919–1923) and Bernard Muscio in
Sydney pursued industrial psychology, although Mayo left Australia and
established his significant reputation overseas. Morris Miller in Hobart undertook
psychological work that influenced public policy. W. M. Kyle, who followed
Scott Fletcher in Queensland from 1938 to 1961, worked for the Army
psychological services during the Second World War (Gregory 1987, pp. 72–76).
J. McKellar Stewart (1878–1953) in Adelaide wrote on the unconscious and the
relationship between psychology and ethics (McKellar Stewart 1923, 1926).
In New Zealand, psychology was also topical with C. F. Salmond publishing
a paper on ‘Psychological Literature and Human Nature’ (Salmond 1930) and
T. A. Hunter beginning the first experimental psychology laboratory. Francis
Anderson stands out from this group because of the relative lack of attention
he paid to psychology.
Among the idealists, while there was considerable interest in empirical
psychology conducted in the laboratory, there was an important distinction to be
made between such psychology, allied to natural science, and the philosophical
psychology that served as a path into broader, metaphysical, thought. This
psychology was characterised, in the work of Laurie and W. R. Boyce Gibson, by
a focus on the method and results of introspection and conceptual clarification.
It served to establish key philosophical themes, including the relationship of mind
and matter, and the status of the ‘self’ or personality.
The Australian Export: Samuel Alexander
The early period in Australasian intellectual life produced at least one outstanding
and notable thinker—Samuel Alexander (1859–1938). Alexander was born in
Sydney, educated at the University of Melbourne, and left Australian shores in
1877 bound for Oxford. He eventually became Professor at the University of
Manchester where he remained, never returning to his homeland. Alexander’s
main work, Space, Time and Deity, delivered as Gifford Lectures in 1916–1918,
was a landmark and highly influential in the 1920s and 1930s (Alexander 1920).
Alexander was unusual in his presentation of a wide ranging metaphysic, in the garb
of realism. It had the hallmarks of Scottish idealism and absolute idealists such as
Bradley and Bosanquet, but also presented an interesting form of what became
known as ‘new realism’. Alexander was a venerated figure and influenced realists as
well as many who have been broadly labelled idealists, such as R. G. Collingwood.
In Australia, Alexander was a major inspiration for John Anderson, who lectured
repeatedly on aspects of Space, Time and Deity, particularly its treatment of
categories such as identity, universality, and quality. Anderson developed his
own realist metaphysics through these lectures (Anderson 2005, 2007). For quite
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different reasons, Alexander also attracted Alexander Boyce Gibson—son and
successor to W. R. Boyce Gibson. For A. Boyce Gibson, Alexander was important
because he placed the importance of ‘constructive metaphysics’ ahead of
epistemology. Alexander exemplified ‘the “natural piety” which he preached as
an antidote to the bragging anthropolatry of humanistic Idealism’. Yet his realism
was ‘more conciliatory and more far-reaching’ than that of Moore and Russell,
precisely because of his metaphysics and his search for ‘the place of mind in the
universe’ (Boyce Gibson 1938, pp. 251–252).
Alexander’s work continues to find defenders. One such defender claims that his
work has been widely misinterpreted and that it offers ‘a highly original version of
physicalism under which higher level properties are realised by combinations of
lower level properties and relations but where those higher level properties are
nonetheless causally efficacious’ (Gillett 2006, pp. 262–263). This continued
reinterpretation of Alexander’s metaphysic of emergence suggests an inherent
attractiveness in the ambiguity of what might be called the pursuit of idealist
concerns in a realist form. As we shall see, similar ambiguities can be found in
a number of the Australasian idealists.
Idealism in Australia
The Rise of Idealism
Writing in 1929 and reflecting on nearly 50 years of academic philosophy in
Australia, Morris Miller noted the strength of idealism in Australia. He remarked
on the conjunction in Australia of an idealist philosophy with a highly practical and
pragmatic worldview. Other philosophies were present, but they were not strong
enough to result in any great contest between key ideas. Idealism was particularly
associated with dynamism in ideas and in nation building. Miller commented:
It is not desired, by any means, to leave the impression that naturalism or materialism in
philosophy is inimical to national advancement or springs from immaturity or decadence.
But it has never stood alone in the forefront of philosophical development; and where it has
appeared to do so, it has rather been as a foil to idealism than as a power of independent
standing. Behind it there ever lurks a background of idealistic presuppositions. (Miller
1929, p. 246).
Idealism had become the leading tendency in Australian philosophy because it
was a dynamic and resurgent element within British philosophy. Australian
philosophers sought to engage with exciting and influential ideas found in the
work of Edward Caird, the Scot Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, and T. H. Green.
Idealism was also dominant because the first generation of Australian philosophers
was relatively long serving. Laurie retired in 1911, to be replaced by the personal
idealist W. R. Boyce Gibson, while Francis Anderson retired in 1921. Mitchell,
who died in 1962 at the age of 101, was Professor of Philosophy until 1922, and
Vice Chancellor, then Chancellor at the University of Adelaide, ceasing his respon-
sibilities only in 1948.
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A variety of strains can be found within Australian idealism. Kantian and
personalist influences were most fully represented, while Hegelian tendencies
were more muted. Anderson, Laurie, and Miller, for example, were chiefly
influenced by Kantian idealism, with its emphasis on the a priori conditions of
knowledge. W. R. Boyce Gibson represented the personalist strain and derived
much of his thought in response to Descartes and to the contemporary German
thinker Rudolf Eucken. Miller was similarly influenced by Eucken, as was
J. McKellar Stewart, who moved from Melbourne in 1923 to replace William
Mitchell. Descartes was the focus of work by A. Boyce Gibson andW. A. Merrylees
(Boyce Gibson 1932; Merrylees 1934). Bergson attracted considerable attention
and was the subject of a study by McKellar Stewart (1911) and interested both
Boyce Gibsons (Boyce Gibson 1937; Boyce Gibson 1911–1912). W. R. Boyce
Gibson studied with Husserl and McKellar Stewart wrote on him, although a book
on his work was destroyed by fire while still in manuscript (Smart 1990). As we
shall see, William Mitchell’s complex variant of idealism was a curious blend of
influences, including Reid, Green, Bradley, James Ward, and William James.
Selwyn Grave, in his seminal history of Australasian philosophy, partly attrib-
uted the prominence of idealism to its apparent links to orthodox Christianity, at
a time when Christianity was both a key intellectual and public doctrine (Grave
1984, p. 25). Grave cited, in particular, the work of thinkers such as W. R. Boyce
Gibson as exemplifying this approach. But while idealism was clearly religious and
its practitioners often practicing Christians, it is not so obvious that idealist philos-
ophy always sat easily with Christian doctrine. Rather, idealist thought could veer
towards a generalised theism, linked to Christianity, but not equivalent to it. It is
telling that A. Boyce Gibson noted that he was not brought up to believe in the
Christian doctrine of incarnation and that it came upon him at a later point as
a momentous discovery (Boyce Gibson 1964, p. 3).
The Idealist Concerns
The forms of idealism found in Australian philosophy are best characterised as a set
of concerns rather than as a single body of doctrine. Starting from consciousness,
and particularly from moral activity, idealists pursued moral, metaphysical, and
religious themes, underpinned by a unified account of the world. They gave
appropriate acknowledgement to the development of materialist natural sciences.
Typically, they accepted the findings of natural science in all areas other than those
that related to self-consciousness and the activities of mind. They refused to reduce
consciousness or mind to matter and made mental and moral experience central to
their account of the unity of the world. The idealists took little interest in, and were
often hostile to, other doctrines that have sometimes been labelled ‘idealist’, such as
the attempt to resolve all reality into mental phenomena or the theory of perception
in general.
Miller’s account of Laurie’s position might also be taken to summarise much of
the early Australian idealist position:
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An idealism that denies external reality is no true idealism. The experience of the real is
admitted. What the idealist wants to know is the nature and meaning of reality; and as to its
nature and meaning there may be and is a great variety of opinions. No one in his senses
doubts the existence of material objects. . . . In a like manner we know mental facts as
distinct from physical facts or processes. We may speak of mental processes as internal and
of physical processes as external; but neither internality nor externality is applicable to
mental processes as such. They are entirely different from the physical. They are not
coordinate, to use Mitchell’s words with which Laurie agrees; and “their correlation does
not mean identity of nature”. (Miller 1930, p. 10).
When seen in the context of later developments in philosophy, the idealists often
appear to eschew technical argument and definition. With the exception of Mitchell,
the idealist approach to philosophy appears more literary in orientation, but also
directed to a wider audience than much more recent work. A particular strength of
the idealist approach to philosophy was the ability to bring multiple perspectives to
bear on an issue, both critically and constructively. An example of this was the
tendency to approach a key theme, such as the concept of personality, simulta-
neously from a moral, metaphysical, and psychological perspective. They typically
sought to penetrate or to grasp an issue in its fundamentals, and subsequently to
convey the insight they had gained to others. In the work of some of the idealists, it
was clearly also their intention to motivate and inspire others in their own work.
As in Britain, idealism in Australia was a philosophy of engagement with moral
and social issues. Many of its adherents made significant practical contributions to
society and politics. Francis Anderson was notably influential in the reform of
teaching in New South Wales and through a variety of other movements such as the
League of Nations Union (O’Neil 1979). Mitchell became a prominent university
administrator (Edgeloe 1993), as did others such as Morris Miller. In New Zealand,
MacGregor was an important advocate of social Darwinist policies, having retained
much of the influence of Herbert Spencer, who was widely reviled by most idealists
(Tennant 1993; Tennant and Hanson 1979). William Anderson engaged with issues
associated with educational reform and the development of ‘self’ and character
(W. Anderson 1928, 1944).
Henry Jones’ Tour of Australia
While the influence of Hegel, with its emphasis on the development of mind and on
history, was less prominent in Australasian philosophy, it was the great Welsh
philosophical orator and Hegelian Henry Jones (1852–1922) who provided one of
the landmark events in Australasian philosophy.
In July and August 1908, Jones, Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University
of Glasgow, undertook what must surely be the largest, and perhaps the only,
blockbuster philosophical tour of Australia (Boucher 1990). Among those who
attended his public lectures was Alfred Deakin, three-time Prime Minister of
Australia, close friend of the American idealist philosopher Josiah Royce and
himself recognised by a number of philosophers for his philosophical interests.
Jones toured Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, Newcastle, and Wollongong.
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He was feted on his travels and drew audiences of up to 800 people to his lectures.
His Sydney lectures were subsequently published as Idealism as a Practical Creed
(Jones 1909) and became an important reference point for a variety of figures who
sought to link the philosophical and the political worlds.
Jones had both personal and intellectual affinities with many of the philosophers
and other key figures he met. In Sydney, for example, his friend Mungo MacCallum
was Professor of English. In Melbourne, he dined with the Governor (a personal
friend), Deakin, and Laurie, with whom he shared a deep admiration for Browning.
In Adelaide, he met with Mitchell whose Structure and Growth of the Mind (1907)
he had read for Macmillan.
Characterised as a ‘preacher’ of philosophy, Jones found a receptive audience
for his message that the universe is a spiritual unity. He claimed that his Hegelian
philosophy reflected the teaching of Jesus, and interpreted evolution as a theory that
spiritualised nature. Jones was particularly important as a social and practical
philosopher, building a case for State legislative intervention to provide the condi-
tions for the development of character. In Australia he welcomed, and sought to
inspire, social and political experiment. Both Deakin and H. V. Evatt welcomed his
theoretical account of the breakdown of the opposition of liberalism and socialism
that they each sought in practice (Boucher 1990; Hetherington 1924, pp. 103–109,
209–212).
It would be going too far to suggest that Jones’ tour in itself had a lasting impact
on the philosophical and political climate in Australia, but his sojourn is important
for the light it sheds on the openness of Australian intellectual life at the time to
idealist thinking.
Early New Zealand Philosophy
As in Australia, the majority of prominent early philosophers in New Zealand were
from Scotland, although they often owed more to other traditions, rather than to
modern idealism.
Commencing in 1871 at the University of Otago, Duncan MacGregor
(1843–1906) was the first appointment to a Chair of Philosophy in New Zealand.
He is perhaps best considered as a Spencerian and controversialist, rather than an
idealist. Born in Aberfeldy, Perthshire, MacGregor studied at the University of
Aberdeen and distinguished himself by winning a Fullerton, Moir, and Gray
Scholarship in Classics and Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. He followed
this with a medical degree at the University of Edinburgh. It was on the strength of
his potential that he was made, at the age of 27, the youngest professorial appoint-
ment at Otago and therefore the youngest in the country. Uniquely, MacGregor was
the first at Dunedin hospital to perform an operation ‘under Listerian principles of
antiseptic surgery’. This was all the more remarkable as he was qualified as an
academic of medicine and a health administrator, not as a surgeon! (Tennant 1993).
MacGregor is remembered less for his philosophical output and more for
the force and nature of his personality as well as his radical views on social policy.
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An early defender of female emancipation, as well as an enthusiast of Spencerian
principles of social Darwinism, MacGregor argued on grounds of social inclusion,
and preparedness for ‘the battle of life’, that women should abandon Miltonian
ideals of womanly submissiveness, eschew ‘ivy drapery’ and ‘tawdry accomplish-
ments’, and be treated and regarded in exactly the same way as men (Tennant
1993). MacGregor was also noted for producing a series of articles on poverty,
arguing that the colonies offered a chance to ‘turn over a new leaf in the history of
nations’ (Coleman 1958; MacGregor 1876). However, MacGregor’s rationale for
this was Spencerian: ‘the hopelessly lazy, the diseased, and the vicious’ would
normally be ‘weeded out by natural selection’, and it was the task of modern society
to incarcerate the diseased, the dangerous, and the destitute (MacGregor 1876).
MacGregor also appeared to be concerned about the ‘contamination’ of New
Zealand society by lower races (Tennant 1993).
MacGregor created a storm of controversy when he advocated the study of
evolutionary biology and sociology, coupled with a religious agnosticism (Numbers
and Stenhouse 2000, p. 337). He also persisted in teaching evolutionary theory to
students intended for the Presbyterian Ministry. This infuriated those who hoped he
would be a safe appointment to the Chair. The Presbyterian Synod, and some
influential church members, advocated that students withdraw from his classes and
tried to prevent his further influence by unsuccessfully attempting to divide the
professorial chair he occupied (Tennant 1993). MacGregor is probably the only
professor of philosophy to forge a subsequent career as Inspector of Lunatic Asylums,
a position he held from 1886 until 1898. In this capacity, he continued to advocate
social Darwinism by means of a ‘scientific’ approach to welfare in his reports to
parliament (Egarr 2006; MacGregor 1897; Murray 1944; Tennant and Hanson 1979).
William Salmond (1835–1917) was born and educated in Edinburgh where he
studied theology, eventually becoming a minister in North Shields, England, for
17 years. He was appointed as the first professor of Theology at the Presbyterian
Theological College in Dunedin in 1876. Following the publication of his The
Christian Doctrine of Providence and Prayer and the Reign of Law (Salmond
1875), Salmond gained a reputation as an apologist for the ‘reasonableness of
Christianity’. This led to his succeeding MacGregor in the Otago Chair of
Philosophy. The Presbyterian Synod of the time hoped for a religiously orthodox
philosopher at the helm (Matheson 1993). He followed his appointment, however,
with the publication of The Reign of Grace (Salmond 1888), a provocative
document arguing for the compatibility of science and religion and decrying the
‘intellectual terrorism’ of Calvinism as inhumane. He was accused of hypocrisy and
his views were denounced as heretical, although Salmond ultimately retained his
appointment (Matheson 1993).
Salmond’s replacement, Francis W. Dunlop (1874–1932), was appointed
professor of philosophy at Otago in 1911. Like Boyce Gibson in Melbourne,
Dunlop was associated with the work of Rudolf Eucken; Dunlop studied with
Eucken and wrote his dissertation on Hegel: Hauptomente in Hegel’s Begriff der
Personlichkeit (1903). His philosophical output was scant, and his only known
publication is Deep Love’s Severity and Other Sermons (Dunlop 1908).
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Other foundation professorial appointments in New Zealand include
C. F. Salmond, son of William, at the University of Canterbury (appointed in
1901) and Hugh Mackenzie (1861–1930) at Victoria University (appointed in
1899). Neither appointment led to major philosophical output (Gardner et al. 1973;
History of Philosophy at the University of Canterbury; Salmond 1929, 1930).
Mackenzie’s professorial chair was in English Language and Literature.
However, in keeping with the spirit of the times, he was prepared to be ‘professor
of things in general’ including Mental Science (Ardley 1982). His only known
writings, on aesthetics, the development of the English Language, and a variety of
religious themes, remain unpublished (Mackenzie 1911, 1917a, b, 1921).
Mackenzie’s work at Victoria was supplemented by the arrival of Thomas
Hunter (1876–1953), an English rationalist philosopher, appointed in 1907 to
the Chair of Mental Science and Economics (later Mental Science and Moral
Philosophy). Hunter was strongly influenced by the psychological work of
William Wundt, E. B. Titchener, and William Rivers and applied the new theories
and experimental approaches developed in Europe to problems of perception
and learning. He became Principal of the university and then its first Vice
Chancellor and was knighted in 1939 (Beaglehole 1946, 1951, 2007). However,
like MacGregor, Dunlop, both Salmonds, and Mackenzie, Hunter produced little in
the way of philosophical publications; what he did produce bore evidence of his
psychological interests (Hunter 1924, 1927, 1928, 1932, 1952). However, he did
leave behind the first experimental psychology laboratory in New Zealand (Brown
and Fuchs 1971).
The only other New Zealand philosopher besides Dunlop to hold discernibly
idealist views, and who did publish philosophical work, was John Anderson’s
brother, William Anderson (1889–1955). Like his brother John, Anderson was
educated in Glasgow under Henry Jones. Like John, William found a professorial
post in the far-flung colonies. Anderson succeeded the indefatigable New Zealander
J. P. Grossman (1865–1953) to the chair at the University of Auckland in 1921
(Ardley 1982). During his tenure, Anderson was influential in promoting quasi-
religious, Aristotelian, and democratic strands of idealist thought, especially as
they applied to educational policy. He exhibited ‘an antipathy to state control
and centralised administration’, a commitment to rationality, and an ‘instinct of
decency faithful to the common man’ (Ardley 1982, pp. 18–20). William Anderson
entered the fray of educational reform, arguing in The Flight from Reason in New
Zealand Education that it was wrong that only the wealthy could afford ‘what has
hitherto been the right of all, a grammar-school education’ (Anderson 1944, p. 7;
Collins 2003).
While not as prolific as his younger brother across the Tasman, he did leave
a number of papers on topics as diverse as ‘Psycho-biology and Democracy’, ‘Self’,
and ‘Academic Freedom’ (Anderson 1923b, 1926, 1928, 1930b, c, 1934, 1938a, b).
His philosophy has been described as being written in the language of Bradley,
Bosanquet, Caird, and Green, but being ‘directed to the pregnant simplicities of
reflective common sense and to the cultivation in his students of theoria and phronesis
in a manner which would have won Aristotle’s approval’ (Ardley 1982, p. 18).
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According to Anderson, ‘Philosophy is the theory of practice’, ‘coextensive with
political theory’, and ‘the nearest analogue of philosophy is to be found in the
deliberative and legislative functions of a democratic community’ (Anderson 1923b,
pp. 241, 246). The aim of philosophy, moreover, is mental contemplation, from which
flows good deliberation and morally correct practice. Naturalist views of the world,
according to Anderson, are misguided in abandoning the importance of reflective
contemplation. They have got the ‘world the wrongway up’ (Ardley 1982, p. 19). This
anti-naturalist attitude informs Anderson’s views on the nature of mind and conscious-
ness. In his paper on ‘Self’, for example, Anderson argues for an account of self as
a ‘supreme universal’, distinct from its various particular realisations (Anderson
1928). In view of John Anderson’s philosophical trajectory on matters concerning
naturalism and the self, nothing could be more different. Intellectually at least, the
Anderson brothers may well have stared uncomprehendingly at each other across the
Tasman.
In contrast to the early New Zealand philosophers, their Australian counterparts
were relatively prolific, and in the following sections we detail some of the concerns
of each of the major Australian idealists.
Henry Laurie (1837–1922): Australia’s First Professor
of Philosophy
Henry Laurie was the first person to be appointed to a chair of philosophy in
Australia, a position he held from 1886 to 1911. This appointment occurred
following the secession of Philosophy from the Classics department at the
University of Melbourne in 1881.
Laurie is now remembered largely for his founding role in academic philosophy,
and particularly for having written an article advocating the creation of a chair in
philosophy shortly before being appointed to a lectureship in philosophy in 1881.
Laurie was, however, highly regarded as a teacher and for his critical commentar-
ies. More than a century later, his book Scottish Philosophy in its National Devel-
opment remains a clear and insightful discussion of the leading Scottish thinkers
from the early eighteenth century onwards (Laurie 1902). Laurie adopted
a consistent critical position throughout the book, which drew on a Kantian theory
of knowledge and a moral theory continuous with the idealist revival of the late
nineteenth century. In Passmore’s view, Laurie attempted ‘to retain the distinction
between God, the individual mind, and nature . . . by grafting quasi-Kantian
idealism onto a Scottish common-sense stem’ (Passmore 1963, p. 140).
Born in Scotland in 1837, Laurie studied at the University of Edinburgh, where
he came under the influence of A. Campbell Fraser. He never graduated, having
suffered from poor health. Instead, he emigrated first to Canada and then to
Australia in 1864, settling at Warrnambool, where he became town clerk and
then a journalist. In 1877 he co-founded the Warrnambool Standard, which
continues to this day (Smith 1986, pp. 7–8). Laurie, like Quaife, therefore enjoyed
the distinction of having been a newspaper editor before becoming a professional
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philosopher. During and after his professional career, Laurie continued to
participate in broader public life, publishing journalistic pieces, poetry and work
on ethics, Browning, and Plato.
Browning’s poetry was particularly important to Laurie, whose philosophy
reflected many of its themes. For Laurie, Browning showed the ability of art to
lead philosophical thought; Browning was interested in the world of thought and
feeling, rather than that of action. For Laurie, Browning’s poetry explored an
aspiration towards an ideal, rather than an ideal attained. Browning showed
a ‘faith that a wise and good Intelligence is at the heart of things, that the world
is the manifestation of a loving purpose, and that even sin and sorrow are subser-
vient to the good’. Yet Browning’s faith also held that the power for good ‘demands
the moral activity of man’ (Laurie 1889, 1912, pp. 59–60).
Laurie’s Idealism
Laurie was known for the fairness of his critical appraisals of the work of others;
Grave noted that even Laurie’s students had difficulty identifying a clear philo-
sophical orientation in his work. Grave nevertheless characterised Laurie as ‘a sort
of idealist, an idealist of the sort disposed to regard itself as a sort of realist’ (Grave
1984, p. 16). The comment might also be made of many others in the tradition,
whose idealism implied contact of the mind with the reality in which it participated.
Idealists such as Henry Jones, for example, denied the possibility of epistemology,
because it was a theory of the mediation of mind and reality.
Miller, who had been a student of Laurie and wrote a lengthy appreciation of his
work, stressed that he had been a critical thinker rather than a systematic one (Miller
1930, p. 5). Nevertheless, to be an idealist at this time was certainly to hold, more or
less explicitly, a systematic conception of philosophy and of reality. Indeed, Miller
drew attention to several elements in Laurie’s philosophy that point to an inherently
unified view, including his treatment of psychology as a propaedeutic to philoso-
phy, as well as a focus on moral experience.
In his last published work, Plato in English Literature, Laurie identified Plato as
‘a great Idealist’, but distinguished three kinds of idealism. The first kind of
idealism resolves all knowledge into ‘sensations or other states of Mind’. This
‘subjective idealism’ was a ‘heresy’ that could not be attributed to Plato (though it
fits a common caricature of idealist thought). The second kind of idealism empha-
sises the role of ideals in human life, both in terms of our ability to form them and to
pursue them. This makes Plato and everyone else an idealist, and Laurie chose
rather to restrict this definition to those who pursue ‘worthy ideals’. The third type
of idealism was, however, the most important. In the third sense, idealism is
a ‘theory of the universe’ or of ‘reality’. The highest ideals we pursue are
taken to be a clue to reality, and the world is interpreted in their light. The good,
the true, and the beautiful become concepts through which to interpret the Universe.
Plato was to be understood as the ‘great protagonist of Idealism’ in this
sense, but Laurie also cited the personal idealist A. S. Pringle-Pattison in this regard
(Laurie 1921, pp. 2, 4–6).
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Laurie did not call himself an idealist in any of the three senses, although his
affinities were most clearly with the second and third definitions. His clearest
personal statements were either as an advocate of ‘mental philosophy’ in general
or as a staunch critic of materialism. In his ‘A Plea for Philosophy’ from 1881 and
‘The Study of Mental Philosophy’ of 1885, Laurie argued for the key role of
philosophy in civilisation and education while recognising the pragmatic and
‘utilitarian spirit of the age’ (Laurie 1881, p. 76). Nevertheless, he argued that
philosophical questions could not be avoided. Philosophical positions were
betrayed in the work of, for example, physical scientists and theologians. They
were also explored by the poets: Wordsworth, Tennyson, and Browning could in
fact be said to have been in advance of philosophical thought. Philosophy in the late
nineteenth century, and particularly in the British universities, was renascent,
largely through the renewed stimulus of continental European thought. The study
of philosophy was therefore an essential aspect of student contact with the direc-
tions of modern thought and the intellectual traditions out of which it had arisen
(Laurie 1881, 1885).
Laurie’s Theory of Mind
Underpinning Laurie’s view that philosophical questions could not be avoided was
a Kantian view of knowledge, which is evident throughout all of his writings.
Against the view that knowledge arises out of experience alone, he maintained
that mind ‘contributes certain elements of cognition’. In particular, it provides the
key concepts of universality and necessity which support scientific and practical
experience alike. Knowledge is ‘experience plus the thinking mind’. Laurie held
that this was in itself sufficient to dispose of materialism, since materialism as it
stood sought to explain knowledge by reference to the material world and the
effects of sensation (Laurie 1881).
The theory of knowledge was, however, less important to Laurie’s philosophy
than the metaphysical aspects of his theory of mind and his moral philosophy. In
a substantial piece on ‘Materialism’, from 1907, Laurie set out the reasons why he
rejected materialism. Mental facts and physical facts are distinct and mental facts
are never resolvable into physical facts. Therefore they are not resolvable into
biological facts either (Laurie 1908).
Laurie was prepared to follow the notion that there is a science of the brain and
that this would show that mental facts are ‘changes in the nervous system’. But
material facts and mental facts differ significantly. A material object occupies
space, but mental facts (such as mental objects or mental acts) do not. The two
may be correlated, but are always distinct. Nor are mental facts a form of motion of
the brain, and mental actions are not properties of material things; the brain is not
the mind, and the mind is not the brain. Whereas we can seek to be acquainted with
physical facts by attending to them, we become acquainted with the mind by
introspection. Similarly, while matter involves energy, there is no equivalence
between volition and muscular movement. Where the materialist theory explains
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how physical causes produce physical effects, it cannot explain how consciousness
can be a by-product of such causal chains. Nor can it, therefore, explain how mental
life is full of activity and life. Following G. F. Stout, Laurie argued that, on the
materialist theory, ‘mind has no efficiency within itself. We do not direct our
thoughts or imaginations. . . man as a conscious being never does anything at all’
(Laurie 1908, pp. 250, 256).
Laurie’s Moral Theory
The moral sphere was, for Laurie as for most other idealists, both the distinguishing
point between the world of the mind and the world of physical science, and
supremely active and self-governing. In ‘Materialism’, Laurie drew attention to
the world of our mental experience as representing a ‘unity of consciousness’ in
a ‘continuous series’; it is only in such terms that man can be understood. The unity
of consciousness, however, brings a new character into the world, of which a theory
of the universe or of reality must take adequate account (Laurie 1908, pp. 259–260).
In his criticism of Reid, Laurie argued that moral actions are influenced by moral
motives, but that they go beyond this and express character. Personality is free, not
in the sense of being independent of motives, or apart from them, but in the sense of
being able to form and act on moral ideals—‘there is nothing parallel to this in the
sphere of physical causation’ (Laurie 1902, p. 158). Moral causes produce moral
effects. Moral intuitions, he argued, involve the pursuit of ideals, which have
changed over generations. These intuitions cannot be explained by hereditary
transmission of acquired characteristics, but only by the handing down of
moral precepts in writing, orally, and in examples, including through punishment
(Laurie 1903).
Science and philosophy alike presuppose that the world is intelligible. For
natural science, this intelligibility comes from concepts such as causation. For the
moral sphere, it comes from the experience of ends, purpose, and choice. In
‘Materialism’, Laurie ventured the view that the mechanical world might also be
subject to the concept of ends. The material world could be understood only in
relation to thought. Intelligence combines qualities into precepts; mind is construc-
tive, and the distinction between mind and matter arises only through the activity of
thought. Far from mind being an effect of matter, matter exists only as related to
mind. A unified account of the world would be achieved by showing that the
mechanical world and the moral world are in fact united under concepts that
apply to mind, particularly the concept of purpose. The theory of evolution would
be preserved because the universe would be read in the light of the highest features
of evolution. Indeed, the evolution of the universe would no longer be seen as ‘a
succession of aimless changes; it is instinct with purpose, shot through and through
with thought’ (Laurie 1908, p. 262).
It seems, then, as if Laurie had, at least at some point in his career, succumbed to
the ‘heresy’ of abolishing matter by resolving it into mind. But this would be to
misunderstand his point. Laurie sought to preserve a unitary explanation of the
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world. He had rejected materialism as a sole explanatory causal factor. Laurie
rejected parallelism because it violated the concept of a single universe and he
could not accept that mind and matter were completely isolated from each other
(Laurie 1908, p. 258). He maintained their distinction but offered the interpretative
concepts of ends and purpose, which he held to be fundamental to the moral world,
as the basis for the interpretation of the universe as a whole. The unity of the
universe is interpretative, rather than reductive.
Perhaps the most remarkable of Laurie’s published papers is his lecture ‘Some
Thoughts on Immortality’ (1901), which brings together many of his key themes,
and strikes an unusual balance between the critical and constructive tendencies in
his thought. Laurie followed Kant in rejecting any argument for immortality based
on the nature of the soul and in turning attention to the moral argument. This is an
argument that we pursue as our highest goals ends which can be attained; there can
be progress towards an ideal. Laurie noted, though, that Kant anchored his argu-
ment in a relatively weak case for the existence of God. Laurie’s own response was
to focus on elaborating the moral argument, preserving immortality as a plausible
hypothesis (Laurie 1901).
Science presupposes that the world is an intelligible system, and Laurie extended
this assumption to religion and morality. When the universe is seen as rational from
the perspective of morality, it is difficult to see it as being so irrational as to permit
the pursuit of ideals that can never be fulfilled, and then for the pursuit to end
abruptly in death. Materialism would hold otherwise, but materialism fails because
mind cannot be reduced to a by-product of physiological change. Matter can be
‘conceived only as related to sentience and thought’. The idea that the soul perishes
with the death of the body has as much plausibility as the idea that it survives. The
hope of immortality cannot be abolished by any argument about the relationship of
mind and body. Neither can any hypothesis about immortality be proved as if it was
a scientific hypothesis. There is no ground for dogmatic assertions about immor-
tality, either for or against. But the hope may be found, as with Tennyson and
Browning, conjoined with ethical feeling. It is a belief not a desire, one that results
from interpreting the universe from a moral perspective: ‘To one in the plenitude of
life, life approves itself and gives promise of its continuance’ (Laurie 1901,
pp. 22, 25).
Francis Anderson (1858–1941): The Christian Idealist
Francis Anderson’s role in Sydney philosophy was akin to that of Laurie in
Melbourne. Anderson was the first Challis Professor of Logic and Mental Philos-
ophy, a position he held from 1890 until 1921, having first been made Lecturer in
Logic and Mental Philosophy in 1888. Like Laurie, Anderson was a Scot who
emigrated first to Victoria in 1886; unlike Laurie, Anderson had a strong back-
ground as a professional philosopher (Lovell 1941; O’Neil 1979).
Anderson was a graduate of the University of Glasgow, where he had a very
successful career. As the result of winning a fellowship, for 2 years Anderson
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became an assistant to Edward Caird. He also pursued theological studies and
taught English literature.
Since his death, Anderson’s reputation has rested on his contributions to the
broader field of education reform. He was involved in a considerable expansion of
the scope of university teaching. The subjects he promoted ranged from economics,
politics, sociology, and psychology to teaching. Anderson also played a key role in
redefining the expectations of a university education.
Anderson was particularly influential outside the university, in areas ranging
from adult education to the school system in general. His early experience as
a fourteen-year-old ‘pupil-teacher’ in Scotland fortified his criticisms of the school
system, and his commentaries provoked a commission that led to the abolition of
the ‘pupil-teacher’ system in New South Wales and its replacement by a Teachers’
College. Among his other pursuits, he edited the Australasian Journal of Psychol-
ogy and Philosophy, was Chairman of the Council of Social Service, and State
President of the League of Nations Union. His first wife, Maybanke, was
a prominent suffragist and social reformer who he met through the Kindergarten
Union (Roberts 1997).
In an age when philosophers often taught across wide areas, Anderson had
perhaps the largest brief of any of the early teachers, although he was eventually
able to relinquish the teaching of psychology to an assistant, H. T. Lovell. As with
many of the early figures in Australian universities, Anderson was a revered
teacher, renowned for his sincerity, passion, charm, earnestness, and a relative
familiarity with his students (Lovell 1941, pp. 99, 101).
Anderson’s Christian Idealism
Anderson has been variously described as an ‘idealist and liberal’ or a ‘Christian
idealist’. Grave has characterised his key message as one of ‘self-realisation’.
Lovell concluded that ‘Anderson’s system was a generous eclecticism governed
by a preference for moral philosophy and a keen interest in sociology. . . His
position was at once idealist and liberal—an idealism which served to draw its
main inspiration from Kant’s Categorical Imperative, a liberalism which knew how
to examine dispassionately the work of the Marxian school’ (Grave 1984, p. 20;
Lovell 1941, p. 101).
The moral concern predominates in Anderson’s published work, but it was
underpinned by a conception of the real as rational (Anderson 1923a, 1930a,
1931a, b, c, d). In a paper extolling the philosophy of T. H. Green, Anderson
noted Green’s constant practical and theoretical engagement with ‘ethics and
politics’. This should be seen as a corrective to the narrowness of English philos-
ophy from Bacon, through Locke, to Mill and Spencer. But Green’s moral philos-
ophy itself emerged out of a broader concern to achieve a unity of knowledge.
Green had placed development at the centre of philosophy and seen ‘that all nature
is a process of unfolding’ that is animated by a ‘spiritual principle which can only
be described as thought or reason’. Indeed, there are ‘ends immanent in nature’, and
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it is with these that the ‘scientific explanation of life’ begins. And while it begins
there, it cannot end there for, on this account of the world, religion crowns
knowledge, and ethics flows from the spiritual character of the world (Anderson
1902, pp. 177, 186–188).
Anderson’s Views of Personality and Morality
In his 1922 monograph, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, Anderson argued that
there had been four key revolutions in history, each of which was based on an ideal
of ‘liberty, equality, and fraternity’, although not on the same form of each concept.
There was first a spiritual Buddhist revolution, then a Christian religious revolution,
a political revolution exemplified by that of France, and, finally, an economic
revolution, still underway. Anderson assessed each revolution in terms of its
moral and social dimensions. Buddhism was moral, but inwards in its orientation,
and lacked an effective ‘social gospel’. Christianity centred on personal life,
but had been interpreted through a focus on individual conscience, rather than
through its social aspect.
For Anderson, the principle of personality provided the only true foundation for
civilisation as a series of reciprocal moral relationships. It also provided the basis
for criticism. The French revolution, for example, was political and economic, but it
had a purely negative focus on removing restrictions on action, rather than on the
use of freedom; liberty, equality, and fraternity were formal and negative concep-
tions. The Russian revolution similarly failed to address the moral dimension of
social and political problems, and Anderson argued that State collectivism could
not be a means to achieve the ‘full and free development of the activities of man
as a moral and spiritual being’. In later years, Anderson was a fierce critic of
totalitarianism in all its forms (F. Anderson 1922, p. 21).
To take a positive moral view of freedom is to seek to combine love and justice.
Kant’s moral law is a pointer to this, because it sees man as an end and not simply as
a means. But the true combination of love and justice is only achieved in the idea of
God. This draws reform back to the principle of personality, which Anderson saw as
the foundation of Christianity. The story of history is the story of the unfolding or
discovery of personality, but man breaks the limits of history in pursuit of his moral
goal. The moral dimension is essential to make social and political reform into true
reform, to make not merely a human life, but ‘the good life’ possible for all
(F. Anderson 1922, pp. 17, 20–24).
A New Civilisation
The moral concern similarly underpinned Anderson’s work with the League of
Nations Union and his commentary on the developing crisis in international
relations in the 1930s. He argued that conflict was inevitable in human affairs,
but that war should not be equated with conflict. War arises from ‘the same
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spirit of violence and domination, which is the fundamental evil in human nature’.
It would never be enough to pursue military disarmament, without at the same
time pursuing economic and moral disarmament. It was the last of these which
was the most important. He saw the principles of the League as those of a true
internationalism, of ‘mutual tolerance, respect for law, and sustained rational
control’. In turn, this was part of a broader movement to a new civilisation,
whose economic, political, and social systems must reflect new ends and values,
and which was promoted by increasing physical connection and economic integra-
tion (Anderson 1935, pp. 9, 42).
Anderson criticised leaders in whatever field who were seeking to hinder the
growth of the new international civilisation through policies such as economic
nationalism. He particularly condemned Capitalism, Communism, and Fascism
alike for their narrow conceptions of man and dictatorships of all types for their
attacks on freedom. Indeed, he regarded those who rejected the gospel of peace in
favour of force exercised without responsibility as embodying the Anti-Christ. The
question to ask in relation to support or opposition to the League of Nations was
‘Who is on God’s side?’ (Anderson 1935, pp. 11, 25, 34).
Sir William Mitchell (1861–1962): The Gifford Lecturer
Scottish-born Sir William Mitchell, the Hughes Professor of Philosophy and Vice
Chancellor at the University of Adelaide, was the first major philosopher to live and
work in South Australia. From the commencement of the University of Adelaide in
1874 and until the appointment of Mitchell, the Hughes Chair linked Mental and
Moral Philosophy with English. The holder was not expected to be a specialist in
Philosophy (Miller 1929, p. 248n). Mitchell’s first predecessor, the Rev. John
Davidson (1834–1881), who studied at St. Andrews, was neither a philosopher
nor a graduate and was not ‘of any great culture’ (Walker 1972). He was replaced
by Irishman Edward Vaughan Boulger, who initially showed great promise and
who was appointed to the chair in 1883. However, in 1894, Boulger ‘resorted to
stimulants’ and resigned after failing to perform his duties (‘Boulger, Edward
Vaughan, 1846–?’ 1969). Boulger was followed by Mitchell, who was the first
real philosopher in Adelaide and certainly the first philosopher working in Austral-
asia to gain significant recognition overseas.1
Mitchell was born in Inveravon in Banffshire, Scotland, in 1861. He was the son
of a hill farmer and one of six children. Mitchell studied at the University of
Edinburgh under Campbell Fraser, gaining his MA in Philosophy and then a
D.Sc. by thesis in the Department of Mental Science in 1891. He reluctantly had
a paper published in the journal Mind while still an undergraduate and, following
this, was appointed as an assistant to Henry Calderwood. He was a lecturer in moral
1This section is partly based on the following publications and is reproduced with permission:
Davies (1999, 2003, 2004).
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philosophy at Edinburgh (1887–1890), an examiner in Philosophy and English
(1891–1894), and a lecturer in Ethics and Education at University College, London,
and at the University of Cambridge during the same period. He also spent time as
a lecturer and examiner in English for the Royal University of Breslau in Germany
(Edgeloe 1986).
In 1895, Mitchell accepted the Hughes Chair in English Language and Literature
and Mental and Moral Philosophy at the University of Adelaide, having declined
the Chair of Philosophy and Economics at the University of New Brunswick,
Canada, on health grounds (under threat of tuberculosis). He held the Chair in
Adelaide from 1895 to 1922 (Boucher 2004; Davies 2003; Edgeloe 1986). Mitchell
retired in 1948 at the age of 87, having served as Vice Chancellor (1916–1942) and
later Chancellor (1942–1948), and serving on University Council for 52 years
(Edgeloe 1986). He was the first (and to date only) philosopher working in Australia
to give the Gifford Lectures, at the University of Aberdeen in 1924 and 1926. In
1927 he was knighted for his services to South Australia (Miller 1929). An
impressive building at the University of Adelaide and a State electorate in South
Australia are named after him.
Mitchell’s Administrative Contributions and View of Education
Mitchell is remembered as an important administrative figure at Adelaide Univer-
sity. He was highly successful in obtaining government grants for the university. He
also founded the Chair of Biochemistry (in which he installed his son, Mark); spent
large sums on library acquisitions; and made many administrative contributions,
mainly in the field of Education. These included dramatically restructuring the arts
curriculum to provide ‘a general education in opposition to thewidely-accepted view
that education was simply a means for “getting on”’ (Edgeloe 1986, p. 535). Like
Francis Anderson in Sydney, Mitchell’s early education committed him to the
importance of education as ‘the formation of an intellectual, an aesthetic, and a
moral character, together with various kinds of skill’ (Boucher 2004; Edgeloe 1986).
Central to this was the education of teachers themselves. To this end, Mitchell
embarked on an ambitious plan known as the Mitchell-Bragg plan. This included
forgoing university fees for 2 years for trainee teachers in undergraduate studies, who
were housed within the university. This eventually resulted in Education becoming
a separate bachelor’s-level degree. In parallel, Mitchell also established an indepen-
dent teacher training college with its own governing body (Edgeloe 1986).
In the educational climate of the time, Mitchell’s views on education were quite
radical. He claimed that the fragmentation of knowledge by reason into a variety of
‘isms’ was part of the problem in education. It had resulted in schools and
universities trying to cover too much ground at the expense of considerations of
practice and interest. The aim should be to remove the emphasis on dispassionate
reason and return to considerations of value: ‘Reason is no substitute for
[living value] any more than physiology is a substitute for breathing and digesting’
(Mitchell 1937, p. 7).
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For Mitchell, this pointed to the need for an education system which provides
opportunities for ‘tacit knowledge’ to be explicitly modelled by teachers. On
Mitchell’s view, the teacher models more than explicit rules: he or she also
models implicit understanding. This provides an argument for the importance of
practical education. Practical education fosters the intrinsic merit of interest
and application and does not devalue practice in place of explicit learning via
examinations (Mitchell 1895). True understanding, according to Mitchell, requires
interest and attention to be generated, time to reflect and ponder, opportunity
for explicit modelling of desired routines, and a forum for practicing what
one thinks implicitly: ‘[T]he measure of value of . . . education is not the quantity
of knowledge which it conveys, but that character and permanence of the interest
it creates’ (Mitchell 1895, p. 15). Elsewhere, Mitchell outlined his ‘model’
university:
There would be no examinations, no essays, nor even any prescribed readings; and there
would be no fee. But I should make attendance compulsory for the greater part of one year
in about a student’s third year, and voluntary thereafter. The route would, I believe, soon
reach a stage where lectures would give place to discussion; and, from the start, the
professor in charge would be more the director of a clinic than a lecturer. We might call
him a professor without portfolio, because he is for all students. He would be familiar with
philosophy, but he would have a province of his own, and no chair in the university would
have its province better defined. (Mitchell, 1937, p. 3).
Mitchell was considered something of a polymath, being engaged to teach
economics and education as well as philosophy, psychology, and literature.
It might be disputed how much teaching he actually did in economics and
literature—though a recent publication claims that he taught economics four eve-
nings a week in addition to his other duties as Professor of Philosophy and Vice
Chancellor (Economics at Adelaide 2003). There is no doubt that he was a man of
considerable energy. It was perhaps for this reason that he famously described his
professorial chair not as a chair but a sofa. Mitchell was also said to be an easy-
going character, ‘with absolutely no pretentiousness or pomposity about him’
(Edgeloe 1986).
Mitchell wrote two books: his main work, Structure and Growth of the Mind
(1907), and The Place of Minds in the World (1933). He also published a number of
shorter papers on a variety of topics including ‘Reform in Education’, ‘What is
Poetry?’, ‘Lectures on Materialism’, ‘Christianity and the Industrial System’,
‘Nature and Feeling’, ‘The Quality of Life’, and ‘Universities and Life’ (Mitchell
1895, 1898, 1903, 1912, 1929, 1934, 1937). Mitchell was also a regular contributor
to the early editions ofMind and frequently wrote shorter pieces for newspapers on
topical issues, such as the First World War. He argued for a patriotism that
concentrated on ‘the country’s task, welfare, honour, and shame’, as opposed to
simplistic and jingoistic ‘us versus them’ nationalistic accounts (Edgeloe 1986;
Mitchell 1918).
Because of his considerable abilities as an academic, administrator, and social
commentator, Duncan and Leonard describe Mitchell as ‘the nearest approach to
36 M. Davies and S. Helgeby
a philosopher-king the academic world has ever seen’ (Duncan and Leonard 1973,
p. 78; Trahair 1984). Australian philosophy, it may be said, has seen no one like
him, before or since (Thom 2007).
Mitchell’s Philosophical Writing
Mitchell always considered himself to be, first and foremost, a philosopher
(Smart 1962). Curiously, however, he is not remembered at all as such, and—like
W. R. Boyce Gibson and Francis Anderson—in academic terms he is today a
largely forgotten figure (Davies 2003). Until very recently, the last critical discus-
sion to appear in print on Mitchell’s work was probably in Blanshard’s Nature of
Thought in 1939 (Blanshard 1939); the last review of his books appeared in 1934
(Acton 1934; Harvey 1934). Little mention has been made of Mitchell in contem-
porary philosophical writing. In Honderich’s Dictionary of Philosophy, Mitchell’s
Structure and Growth of the Mind is described as the last remaining example of
Australian idealism which ‘still survives’ (Honderich 1995).
The contemporary neglect of Mitchell’s work is in sharp contrast to the
widespread praise he received for Structure and Growth of the Mind. Blanshard
cited it extensively and confessed he owed Mitchell a ‘large obligation’ (Blanshard
1939, p. 97); Henry Jones, a normally severe critic, also outlined its merits in
a reader’s report by noting: ‘it is extraordinarily strong and manifests throughout
the most thorough philosophical grasp’ (Boucher 2004). Norman Kemp-Smith
praised it as ‘undoubtedly one of the most important philosophical publications of
recent years’ (Kemp-Smith 1908, p. 332), and R. F. A. Hoernle´ said: ‘In a book
where almost everything is good, it is hard to single out special points to praise’
(Hoernle´ 1909). J. R. Harvey rated Mitchell’s second book, The Place of Minds in
the World, as ‘a book of first importance’ (Harvey 1934, p. 106).
His contemporaries were, however, also highly critical of Mitchell’s style. Even
allowing for the conventions of the time—and taking into account the difficulty of the
philosophical concepts he was engaged with—his work is badly written: often
divorced of clear central themes, lacking in detailed exegesis, and ponderous in
delivery. (A professor of classics at Adelaide at the time ‘used to say that he could
never understandMitchell’s books until he had translated them into Latin’.) (Duncan
and Leonard, 1973, p. 19; Grave 1984, p. 22) One reviewer of Structure and Growth
of the Mind pointed out that, while reading it, one always has to ‘retrace one’s steps
and grope for the context’. The same reviewer complained that, because of ‘no
contour or difference in emphasis’, reading the book was like ‘swimming under
water with never a chance to come up and look about’ (Perry 1908, p. 45). Every-
body, except Mitchell himself, found his work virtually impenetrable, particularly
The Place of Minds in the World. A modern-day reader of Mitchell outlines the
problem as follows: ‘No professional philosopher these days reading for a publishing
house (except perhaps for thosewallowing in the slough of postmodernism)would let
Mitchell get away with it’ (Mortensen 2005, p. 300). More kindly, Passmore called
Mitchell’s books ‘very obviously, the products of a solitary thinker’ (1962, p. 145).
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Mitchell’s Philosophical Influences
A wide range of influences, idealist and empiricist, can be traced in Mitchell’s
philosophy (Davies 2003). From the common-sense philosophers such as Thomas
Reid, Mitchell took the arguments advanced against solipsism and anti-realism. From
T. H. Green, Mitchell derived the idea that an uninterpreted sense datum was simply
folly. From F. H. Bradley, Mitchell took the idea that experience—at least initially—
is a seamless unity of knower and known. From James Ward, Mitchell drew the
important idea that organisms grow and an adequate explanation of mental activity
must capture this. FromWilliam James, Mitchell gained an ‘empiricist streak’ (Thom
2007). Despite being often recognised as one of the ‘triumvirate of early Australian
idealists’ (Franklin 2003; Grave 1976; Kennedy 1995, p. 75), alongside Laurie and
Anderson, Mitchell always insisted in conversations with J. J. C. Smart, a successor
in the Hughes Chair in Philosophy, that he was a staunch realist (Smart 1962).
Mitchell developed complex views on the relationship of mind and matter, which
suggest that he was neither an anti-realist nor an anti-materialist, even though he did
reject any simple-minded reductionism of mind and matter. Instead, he argued that:
. . .When you try to picture the structure and the action of the mind, remember you are
trying to picture the structure and action of the nervous system. In this way you will avoid
the usual confusion of trying to picture a hybrid process consisting partly of visible
movements and partly of invisible feelings. (Mitchell 1907, p. 7). . .
. . .Amind and its experience are realities that are presentable to sense as the brain and its
actions. In that respect themind and experience are not parallel with nature, but part of it. And,
on the other hand, the facts of nature, including the brain, whenever they are phenomena, are
not parallel with mental phenomena, but part of them. (Mitchell 1907, p. 23). . .
. . .As a thing in nature, as visible, tangible, occupying room, etc., the mind and its
experiences are the brain and its processes. (Mitchell 1903, p. 10).
Passmore might have been only partly right when he described Mitchell’s work
as articulating ‘an introduction to an idealist philosophy for which the mind is the
central ontological conception’ (1963, p. 146). Certainly, for Mitchell, the role of
the mind and experience is a pre-eminent consideration. Perhaps the best way to
understand Mitchell’s thought is to see him as articulating a methodological ideal-
ism: the mind and its experiences are the way by which one can understand the
brain and its processes.
Like other early Australian idealists, Mitchell gave appropriate acknowledge-
ment to the development of materialist natural sciences. He more readily accepted,
however, the findings of natural science that related to the nature of mind, even
though he eschewed any simplistic reduction of ‘mind and matter’. It was this that
made his account of consciousness very complex indeed. Mitchell certainly did not
work in the spirit of the Christian Idealists in Australia at the time, such as Francis
Anderson, nor the ‘personal idealists’ such as W. R. Boyce Gibson. Neither did he
attempt to run the gauntlet of their criticisms. Instead, he remained ‘isolated in
Adelaide and uninterested in philosophical controversy’ (Passmore 1963, p. 148).
Mitchell appeared to borrow what he liked from idealism and set about constructing
his own very idiosyncratic system.
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Mitchell’s Philosophy of Mind
Mitchell’s philosophical contributions had as their focus the nature of mind and
experience. His particular interest was in the growth of the mind, and, to a lesser
extent, its ontology. The key elements of his thought are easy enough to state in
general terms: experience is the crucial element of our mental lives, or, to put it
another way, ‘mental activity is central in experience’ (Miller 1929, p. 249).
However, Mitchell was not merely interested in such conscious experiences. He
recognised that not all experience is conscious, but is nonetheless important to the
growth of the mind. Experience, for Mitchell, covered everything from sensory
content, or qualia, to high-level intentional content at various levels.
For Mitchell, there was no principled epistemic divide to be drawn between the
levels of experience. One learns about the mind primarily by studying experience
directly as we live it (the ‘direct’ approach) and secondarily by studying the mind
indirectly by means of the emerging sciences of the mind, for example, neurosci-
ence (the ‘indirect’ approach). Knowledge acquired by means of the direct
approach aids in directing attention to relevant features of the indirect approach.
Mitchell noted that it is only because we have phenomenal experience that we can
make sense, and give meaning to, brain processes—which he viewed as the neural
correlates of experience (Mitchell 1903, pp. 10–11). This reverse-engineering
approach is surprisingly contemporary. It is identical to recent approaches that
use phenomenal experience to provide resources for the empirical findings from the
cognitive and neurological sciences. These days this is sometimes known as the
‘natural method’ (Davies 2003, p. 180; Flanagan 1992; van Gulick 1993).
The action of mind is always action on an occasion (Miller 1929, p. 249).
The occasion, according to Mitchell, is the moment and conditions under which
an experience happens and the content that such conditions bring about.
The occasion is a stimulus property (either mental, physical, or environmental).
Experience is what the mind, the ‘reacting structure’, does in reaction to
its environment. The organism aims to resolve occasions in order to achieve
pragmatic and experiential ends. Thus, we focus our eyes to achieve a better
view. However, this also occurs at higher levels. So, for example, our concepts are
deployed in making sense of more complex experiences. Organisms start off by
resolving low-level instinctual experiences and then move to higher, more
satisfactory levels of experience, though there might be evolutionary and
experiential constraints on particular creatures. As the idea of resolving experi-
ences is a key to Mitchell’s account, this leads to an account which demands levels
of experiential content.
The sensory level is roughly equivalent to instinct. Some organisms remain at
this level and advance no higher. As Mitchell defined it, the course of instinctive
action is ‘the power of pursuing an infinite variety of course [sic], directed through-
out by present sensation’ (1907, p. 194). The next level is perceptual intelligence,
which is equivalent to content which already comes with the power to anticipate
further experiences (e.g., we simply ‘see’ a display of objects and know how to
react; we don’t have to infer our course of action). This has a number of levels
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(feeling, practical and cognitive interests). Some organisms—some humans—even
remain at these levels. The last level is cognitive intelligence which is influenced
by rules, language, and principles, and it helps differentiate the expert from
the non-expert.
On the metaphysics of mind, Mitchell argued that the capacity to experience
allows an inference to the notion of mind (Allen 1984, p. 7). This is rather different
from some current approaches which regard the capacity to experience as a reason
to deny the existence of mind (Churchland 1979, 1986, 1988; Dennett 1988, 1991)
By complete contrast, Mitchell thought that the very structure of experience is
evidence that mind exists (otherwise there would be no evident structure).
Contemporary philosophers refer to the ‘easy’ and the ‘hard’ problem of con-
sciousness. The ‘easy’ problem consists in how brains might do things such as
represent perceptions in thought in a neural or computational form; the ‘hard’
problem consists in explaining how things seem to us in experience (the ‘what it
is like’ of consciousness) (Chalmers 1996). Mitchell developed his ‘indirect’ and
‘direct’ approaches to the mind over a century ago. The ‘indirect’ method offers
a potentially complete understanding of ‘the immediate physical correlates’ of
experience (Mitchell 1907, p. 450). The direct method offers an understanding of
what experience is like ‘from the inside’. Both approaches, according to Mitchell,
are essential. This is surprisingly anticipatory of later discussions in the philosophy
of mind in Australia and elsewhere (Davies 2003).
Mitchell and Current Philosophy
Of all of the Australasian idealists, it is Mitchell whose work resonates most
closely with current concerns. It is particularly relevant to current thinking among
cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind.
At the turn of the twentieth century, Mitchell was attempting something very
new and original. He wrote on issues that are only today being discussed by
philosophers and psychologists as ‘cognitive science’. Mitchell was interested in
science, and especially the psychology, physiology, and neurology of his day.
He read and digested Baldwin’s Mental Development of the Child and the Race
(1906), Loeb’s Comparative Physiology of the Brain (1900), and Campbell’s
Histological Studies on the Localisation of Cerebral Function (1905), among
other texts, as well as a large number of scientific and medical journal articles
(Davies 2003, p. 32n). In his series of Gifford Lectures he aimed to ‘discover what
conclusions about the place and power of minds emerge when due emphasis is placed
upon philosophical and scientific inquiries’ (Acton 1934, p. 243), an approach which
can be said to have ‘a very contemporary ring about it’ (Thom 2007).
Mitchell’s Structure and Growth of the Mind stands as a major (if now unread)
treatise on philosophical psychology (Davies 2003; Mortensen 2005). He seemed to
have anticipated the claims of the ‘new mysterians’ or ‘new dualists’ and their
emphasis on qualia, or subjective experience (Davies 1999). He also seemed to
have anticipated themes associated with perceptual plasticity and developmental
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accounts of the modularity of mind. Liberally interpreted, he might even be seen as
prefiguring connectionist accounts of consciousness with his remarks about ‘the
localisation of sensation and intelligence’ being ‘spread over the entire cortex. The
arrival platforms, or projection areas of mere sensation, extend each to an indefinite
margin, which includes, without a definite dividing line, the parts that are concerned
with organising the sensory elements into definite wholes and parts’ (Mitchell 1907,
p. 483). This was a remarkable a priori conjecture for 1907 and it is not, in essence,
dissimilar from modern accounts: ‘a percept is a pattern of activation over a set of
processing units which takes place via the propagation of activation among units via
weighted connections’ (McClelland 1999, p. 137).2
Mitchell’s first book ranged over issues in mind and content, philosophical
psychology, and neuroscience. His second book covered issues overlapping mind
and the philosophy of physics. This included the then relatively new area of
quantum mechanics. The only copy of the third manuscript of The Power of
Mind—intended as part of a trilogy—is said to have been lost during the London
bombing raids in the 1940s. There are, however, surviving manuscripts of this last
book and summaries of the Gifford Lectures (Mitchell 1926). Regrettably, none of
these has ever reached print.
William Ralph Boyce Gibson (1869–1935): A Philosophy
of Immediate Experience
Like Mitchell, W. R. Boyce Gibson is now relatively little known in Australian
philosophical circles. A chair and a Departmental library at Melbourne University
commemorate the contribution that he and his successor, his son Alexander, made
as Professors of philosophy from 1912 to 1965. W. R. Boyce Gibson’s translation of
Husserl’s Ideas remains well known, but his prolific writings across a wide range of
philosophical concerns are now rarely read.3
Gibson, like John Anderson in Sydney, was a student of Henry Jones at Glasgow.
Both Anderson and Gibson reacted against Jones’ absolutist form of idealism.
Anderson became a vigorous and distinctive realist. Gibson took an altogether
different path, turning first to an alternative movement known as personal idealism,
and subsequently attempting to show how the conflict between absolute
and personal idealism could be overcome by reinterpreting absolute idealism on
personal idealist lines.
Gibson was born in Paris in 1869. His father William was a Methodist minister,
while his mother, Helen, was the daughter of a prominent Wesleyan. The religious
element ran strongly in Gibson’s subsequent philosophy and family life, with his
brother and one of his sons becoming ministers, and he and Alexander making
religion a key theme of their philosophical work. Philosophy ran strong, as another
2Space does not permit an outline of these themes. For a detailed account, see Davies (1999, 2003).
3This section draws on Helgeby (2006), with permission.
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son, Quentin, also became a philosopher. His son Ralph became a leading figure in
the Communist Party, which his widow, Lucy, also joined after his death (Boucher
2005; Grave 1981; Merrylees 1935).
Gibson’s early training and career were in mathematics. This interest in math-
ematics survived into his later work in two forms—through a concern with con-
temporary developments in physical science and in his work on logic. His turn to
philosophy involved studies in both Paris and Glasgow. Rudolf Eucken exerted
a particularly strong hold. Gibson undertook a number of translations of Eucken’s
work with his wife Lucy, as well as a full-scale commentary on Rudolf Eucken’s
Philosophy of Life (Boyce Gibson 1907).
The attraction of Eucken was his attempt to develop a life-philosophy that was
also a philosophy of reality. Eucken articulated a spiritual philosophy and sought to
‘detect the working of this cosmic life within us’. Spiritual life should be seen
as a development of the universe, appropriated through faith, and existing as
‘ceaseless conflict’. For Eucken, life in the twentieth century must seek to reconcile
rationalism with the historical approach and to renew Christianity in a new
‘passionate’ and ‘constructive’ phase of religion, grounded in life (Boyce Gibson
1907, p. 3; Eucken 1909).
Gibson became Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at the University
of Melbourne in 1911, arriving in Australia in 1912; he served from then until
1934. He came to Australia with his reputation established and having published
books on ethics, Eucken, religion, and logic. While he envisaged a second
volume on logic, he did not write it and produced no further books. Instead, his
philosophical output in Australia was largely in the form of journal articles,
themselves often lengthy multi-part treatments of particular philosophical issues
or philosophers. It might be speculated that the teaching obligations of philoso-
phers in the early twentieth century were not conducive to writing books. Never-
theless, university life clearly allowed considerable opportunity for the study of
the work of other thinkers, for Gibson contributed papers on a variety of contem-
porary continental thinkers such as Nicolai Hartmann (Boyce Gibson 1933a,
1934, 1935) and Melchior Palagyi (Boyce Gibson 1928a, b), and also studied
with Husserl.
Gibson’s Personal Idealism
Throughout his philosophical career, Gibson consistently identified himself as
a personal idealist or ‘personalist’. Personalism has a long history, continuing
from the late eighteenth century in Continental philosophical thought and surviving
in a number of forms, both in Europe and in America (Bengtsonn 2006). English
personal idealism was influential from the turn of the twentieth century until the
1920s, but was preceded by that of the Scot A. S. Pringle-Pattison, whose work was
prominent from the 1880s onwards. Personal idealism was seen as a significant
alternative to both the naturalism of nineteenth-century thought influenced by
science and the absolutism of the British Hegelians.
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Personal idealism shared elements with naturalism as well as with absolute
idealism. With naturalism, it shared a focus on experience, but denied that natural-
ism gave an adequate account of that experience. In particular, naturalism was said
to provide an inadequate account of personality and moral action. With absolute
idealism, personalism shared the view that reality is ultimately spiritual, and
similarly denied that absolute idealism gave an adequate account of human expe-
rience. In particular, absolute idealism was said to provide an inadequate account of
human volition. In the collection edited by Henry Sturt, Personal Idealism, personal
idealism was said to issue in an ‘empirical idealism’ that linked ‘a spiritual
philosophy and empiricism’ through ‘personal life’ and ‘the study of common
experience’ (Sturt 1902, pp. v–viii).
Gibson focused on immediate experience but, unlike some other personal
idealists, he ventured a view of the absolute. Indeed, he sought to bridge personal
and absolute idealism by emphasising the idea of the real as rational. For Gibson,
the experience from which we start is personal, but it is also religious and spiritual.
We must conceive the personal in relation to God. It is in this conception that
absolute idealism and personal idealism would discover that they shared the view
that the real is rational and spiritual (Boyce Gibson 1906–1907).
Gibson’s Views on Philosophy and Personality
Although Gibson’s early training had been in mathematics, it was a work on
philosophy of religion that drove his conversion. The conversion took the form of
grasping the difference between causal explanation in the sciences, which depends
on an account of the ‘totality of the relevant antecedent conditions’, and the idea of
‘final causation’. This distinction was driven home to him by the second of Edward
Caird’s Gifford Lectures on The Evolution of Religion, where Caird discussed
‘Different Methods of Defining Religion’. In particular, Caird defined religion not
by examining what is common to religions but through ‘the differentiae of the
highest forms’ (Boyce Gibson 1904, pp. 190–191; Caird 1907, pp. 36–59).
For Gibson, ‘the philosophical baptism, par excellence, is that which confers the
grace of teleological insight’. This insight is quite distinct from the scientific,
causal, and abstract view. To lose this sense of teleology is to lapse from philosophy
into science (Boyce Gibson 1904, p. 192). He consistently upheld a distinction
between philosophy and science, stressing that science was concerned with external
nature, but that philosophy was concerned with experience, in particular the
immediate knowledge that we are purposive. This intuition is an ‘intuition of Ideals,
Values and real possibilities’ (Boyce Gibson 1933b, p. 93; Weigall 1919).
On Gibson’s account, the essence of philosophy is reason which links the ‘whole
of our life and experience’, found, for example, in ‘art, religion, and statecraft’, to
the divine ideals of ‘beauty, truth, and goodness’. Self-critical reason was funda-
mental to philosophy. Although at one point he had held out Hegel as providing the
best definition of philosophy as self-criticism, Gibson’s final works took Plato to be
the exemplar of how philosophy is both argument and an aspiration for truth, in
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a ‘complex unity of intuition, intellect, aspiration, and love’. Gibson shared the
view of Samuel Alexander that philosophy should offer a ‘vision of reality’, and he
stressed that philosophers should be judged not by their conception but ‘by
the comprehensiveness and rigour of the thought through which that insight is
explored and driven home’. At an early stage, he had seen the contemporary role of
philosophy as the search for a ‘Monism of the right kind [sic], which shall do
adequate logical justice to the moral claim of Personality to be free, and creative’
(Boyce Gibson 1902–1903, p. 182; 1923, 1933c).
The fundamental argument that runs through much of Gibson’s thought is that
self-intuition is rational and concrete—it has rational content. In an article written
before he commenced in Melbourne, Gibson pointed to thinkers, such as Des-
cartes, Eucken, and Bergson, who shared the view that ‘the experience of spiritual
power is the fundamental fact with which philosophy has to reckon’. Modern
psychology, particularly that of G. F. Stout, enabled this experience to be analysed
‘as the central fact of life’, traceable from an ‘impression’ through to experience,
and into morality and religion (Boyce Gibson 1911–1912, pp. 87–88).
Following Stout, and with an eye on pragmatism, Gibson identified the impres-
sions of our experience with purposive needs. These purposive needs embrace
values as well as instincts, particularly the ideals of ‘truth, beauty, and goodness’.
‘The experience of power is in last resort the experience of the power of these
ideals in the shaping and perfecting of life’. Towards the end of his life, Gibson
reiterated that: ‘The presence and efficacy of the Ideal is a feature, patent and
palpable, of our very simplest and most ordinary experiences’ (Boyce Gibson
1911–1912, p. 100; 1934, p. 40).
For Gibson, the self is a unification of experience in a spatio-temporal order. It is a
‘non-rational’ unity, which in fact applies to all life, although we become ‘rational
individuals’ through the pursuit of our aspiration. The self is immediately aware of
itself as self. It feels unity not as a unity of parts, but as a unity of ‘total activity’; it is
this ‘total activity inwhich the self’s conscious being consists’. Such experience is not
to be ‘proved’ but to be ‘grasped’, and in grasping it we grasp our ends and ourselves
as purposive agents (Boyce Gibson 1904, pp. 123–138; 1924, pp. 191–192).
Gibson was particularly critical of Kant for eliminating subjective experience in
his account of the transcendental unity of apperception. He also criticised Kant
for treating the category of cause as basic. He argued that Kant thereby eliminated
the ‘really [sic] subjective’. In Gibson’s view, the objective presupposes the
subjective, because objects are made intelligible in relation to subjective interest.
For Gibson, ‘Once you say [the] self [is] an object you’ve taken a step that defeats
any attempt to develop a rational conception of experience’ [sic] (Weigall 1919).
Although personal consciousness begins as ‘psychic unification’, it gains a more
profound dimension through purposive striving. At the level of volition, personal
consciousness becomes rational and derives its unity from the ideal. The ideal
interpenetrates one’s life, and ‘self-development’ fundamentally involves moving
towards a deep unity of aspiration. ‘Personality’ involves the pursuit of an ideal
good and should be contrasted with ‘individuality’, which Gibson saw as a merely
formal notion.
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The notion of personality is not constrained by time or matter, and Gibson (like
many personal idealists) subscribed to belief in immortality. Personality, as it
develops through aspiration for the ideal, must persist. The ideal and the personal
interpenetrate each other, although they do not submerge each other. For Gibson,
the ideal exists as a super-personal being or ‘supersoul’. Gibson’s theory
posited both the ‘central supremacy’ of God and ‘the essential interests of man’s
free, inviolate personality’ (Boyce Gibson 1904, pp. 140–141,151–152, 220–223;
1925a). As with many idealists, however, the God of his philosophy is not
immediately reconcilable with Christian doctrine.
Gibson approached all areas of philosophy from the perspective of immediate
experience. In his first book, A Philosophical Introduction to Ethics (1904), he took
as his key theme the idea that ‘the individual’s own inviolate spiritual experience’ is
‘the central fact in Moral Philosophy and in our human philosophy generally’.
He identified a teleological ‘spiritual principle’ as ‘the unifying agency in personal
experience’ and argued that personal idealism sought the ultimate reality in the only
way it could be sought—‘in and through our own personal experience’.
As a monistic philosophy, personal idealism must seek self-consistency and system,
and it must relate the self to the absolute. Personality must be distinguished from the
absolute, because otherwise the reality and creativity of ‘finite persons’ would be
sacrificed (Boyce Gibson 1904: v–vii, 58, 64–65).
In The Problem of Logic (first edition 1908), Gibson distinguished a number of
phases of logic. ‘Truth’ was to be understood as unity, but his book dealt with logic
as a search for the ‘truth of fact’. He differentiated the ‘propaedeutic’ of logic—the
theories of judgement, proposition, and formal logic—from logic as an account of
scientific method. Gibson defined the ‘unity of thought’ in terms of the realm of fact
relevant to the purposes of the thinker. He treated scientific method through an
account of inference and evidence, where inductive method was also determined by
the concept of ‘relevant fact’. But whereas inductive method was of value in
scientific thinking, in so far as it implied causal determinism it was relevant only
to inorganic fact. Consciousness, on the other hand, implied teleology, and this put
it beyond inductive explanation. Concepts such as ‘freedom’, ‘immortality’ and
‘God’ are beyond mechanical causation, and their logic is a philosophical, rather
than inductive, logic (Boyce Gibson 1914, pp. 1,3–6,314,367,459–462). In a second
volume, never produced, Gibson was to deal with ‘Philosophical Logic’, the inward
meaning of ‘truth’, seen through a ‘Personalistic Logic’.
With his emphasis on freedom and on personality as a psychological unity of
aspiration, Gibson was profoundly indeterminist in relation to the moral and
spiritual realm. This was encapsulated in the logical distinction he drew between
scientific method and philosophy, where one is causal and the other teleological.
We inhabit a world of real possibilities and effective actions. Our freedom of choice
is real, and so is our freedom to create (Boyce Gibson 1925b).
In particular, Gibson argued that imagination is the foundation of volition, in that
imagination establishes ‘possibilities’. For Gibson, possibilities are ‘real constitu-
ents of the volitional world’. Imagination, therefore, provided the psychological
foundation for this realm of possibilities. Gibson suggested that it was necessary to
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recognise ‘a negative and hypothetical moment in volition, the moment or phase
which renders deliberation possible. It is only through such a phase that the natural
situation can pass on into the spiritual’. At this moment, ‘natural impulse’ is
‘arrested’ and turned ‘into a real possibility’. These real possibilities are interme-
diate between the ‘non-volitional’ and the ‘positively volitional’ and represent
the foundation of ethics. The fully undetermined nature of the ethical means it
can become either moral or immoral; it is a source of freedom and becomes
moral or immoral as a result of the exercise of freedom (Boyce Gibson 1933b,
pp. 4–6; 1935, pp. 16–18).
Although Gibson did not produce a completed system, his work was in the
tradition of systemic philosophy, and he worked up his thought particularly through
accounts of ethics, logic, spirituality, and value. That philosophy was, at its core,
a philosophy seeking to ground itself in experience and articulated
through a philosophical psychology. It was a philosophy which could be developed
through a consistent form of criticism, relating concepts back to the content of
immediate experience. Gibson did not, however, leave behind a school. Instead, he
gave a rigorous account of one of the key themes in Australian intellectual life in the
first half of the twentieth century—the concept of personality.
Conclusion: The Decline of Idealism
Looking back over a century since the inauguration of the first chair in philosophy
at Melbourne in 1886, Miller’s judgement (given earlier, section “Idealism in
Australia”) about the dominance of idealism in the early period of Australian
philosophy seems sound. It is also clear that he was writing at a time when the
idealist dominance was being challenged, most clearly in Sydney. Indeed, since the
middle of the twentieth century, open avowals of idealism have been rare, and
the term ‘idealist’ became something of a convenient label with which to dismiss
vast tracts of philosophic thought.
One view of what happened to idealism is that it simply vanished, in Australasia
as elsewhere, to be replaced by realism, pragmatism, Wittgensteinianism, or phe-
nomenology. This is the view taken by Franklin: ‘Absolute Idealism in its day—
around the 1890s—became the first and only philosophy to be accepted as ortho-
doxy in the whole learned world (Paris, Heidelberg, Edinburgh, Peking,
Adelaide. . .). Then it simply evaporated’ (Franklin 2003, pp. 113–114). Franklin’s
account, though, puts the decline of idealism far too early—closer, in fact, to its
modern origins than to its end. At the other end of the spectrum to Franklin, Michael
Devitt half-seriously claimed in the 1980s that idealism still survived in
Melbourne, reflecting the lack of sunshine compared to other Australian cities
(Devitt 1984: vii).
A different view would be that idealism in Australasia declined at around the
same time as in Britain. Idealism was in significant retreat in the British universities
following the death of its great exponents such as Henry Jones in 1922, Bernard
Bosanquet in 1923, and F. H. Bradley in 1924. Even before that, idealism was
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frequently criticised during the First World War for its connections with German
thought. Much of its rhetoric seemed overbearing and out of place in the context of
a new form of war and the international uncertainties that followed. Realism had
experienced its own resurgence, led by thinkers such as Bertrand Russell and
G. E. Moore. New approaches to philosophy began to attract attention, such as
those of Wittgenstein and Husserl.
A generational change also occurred in Australasia. In New Zealand, the decline
of idealism can be traced to 1931, when Dunlop was succeeded to the Chair at
Otago by the British philosopher J. N. Findlay. Although having been a Hegelian,
and later being responsible for a considerable revival of interest in Hegel, Findlay
had been purged of all forms of idealism under the influence of Bertrand Russell.
By the time he arrived in New Zealand, Findlay regarded it as his mission to
‘introduce mathematical logic to the Antipodes’ (Pigden 2007).
In Australia, Laurie had died, and Anderson and Mitchell had retired from their
Chairs by the middle of the 1920s; W. R. Boyce Gibson retired in 1934. There was
a dramatic changing of the philosophical guard when John Anderson arrived in
Sydney. According to Anderson, there were no relations of ideas; no ‘conscious-
ness’ nor conscious knowers; no normative values, judgements, nor feelings; no
‘self’ nor purpose nor God.
Moreover, there were no abstract entities of any sort, no entities over and above
the spatio-temporal world. In social terms, he held the radical thesis that ‘there is no
such thing as the pure individual apart from society, any more than society apart
from the individuals who compose it’ (Anderson 1917). As James McAuley was to
famously put it: ‘John Anderson had an answer to every conceivable question.
It was “No”’ (Bogdan 1984, pp. 6–7). Gilbert Ryle was also reputedly to have said
of Anderson that ‘He thinks there are only brass tacks’ (Honderich 1995, p. 58).
But generational change was not total. When, for example, Mitchell retired from
the professorship in Adelaide in 1922, he was succeeded by John McKellar
Stewart—the first Australian-born professor. He held the chair from 1923 to 1949
(Passmore 1963). McKellar Stewart brought with him familiar idealist themes such
as in his early work on Bergson, viewed from the perspective of a Kantian concep-
tion of reason (McKellar Stewart 1911). He also published on psychological themes
such as the ‘unconscious’ and the relation of psychology to ethics—viewing the
issues through an idealist lens (McKellar Stewart 1923, 1926).
In a different sense, the disappearance of idealism was by no means complete.
In Britain, for example, a new generation of philosophers, such as
R. G. Collingwood and Michael Oakeshott, rejected the label ‘idealism’ but
continued to develop a broadly idealist tradition. Their greatest influence was,
however, often outside of philosophy departments, in history, art, and politics.
In Australia, A. Boyce Gibson was frequently called an idealist, although he
characterised himself as a kind of empiricist, but one who was ‘wide of the type’
(Boyce Gibson 1970, p. 101). He had clearly been influenced by idealism, in both
absolute and personalist forms, and continued to use idealism as a point of
reference. He died in 1972, having produced his major works only after his
retirement (Helgeby 2008).
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Only in the 1980s did a significant reappraisal of British idealism begin, largely
influenced by a perceived alignment between modern ‘communitarian’ social
philosophy and the social and political ideas of Green and his successors. Similarly,
but still more recently, it has been the social and political theory of Australian
idealists that has kept their memory alive, and shown the relevance of idealism
outside of the universities until at least the mid-century (Hughes-Warrington and
Tregenza 2008; Melleuish 1995; Sawyer 2003). The emphasis on the social aspects
of idealist thought brings out a key dimension to their theory and practice. Idealism
had, however, in Australia as elsewhere, a far broader orientation. It is only through
its metaphysical and moral dimensions that its social philosophy can be understood.
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